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ABSTRACT
Thispaper presents a method of studying the distributional consequences
of corporate tax changes by imputing to individual tax returns the net effect
of changes in effective corporate tax rates. Particular attention is given to
the difference between nominal and real capital income, to the problem of
corporate pension funds, and to the automatic effect of corporate tax changes
on dividends and retained earnings.
Application of this imputation method to the tax changes enacted in 1986
shows that the actual distribution of the total tax change was very different
from the traditional distribution of only the personal income tax change. The
net imputed corporate tax increase was equivalent to a rise of 6 percentage
points in the personal income tax among taxpayers with 1988 incomes over
$200,000 and 4 percentage points among taxpayers with incomes between $100,000
and $200,000. The corporate income tax increase also added the equivalent of
an 8 percent rise in the income tax for taxpayers with incomes between $10,000
and $20,000. By contrast, for middle income taxpayers (with incomes between
$30,000 and $75,000) the corporate tax increase was equivalent to an income
tax rise of only 1 or 2 percent. The analysis shows that the higher corporate
tax represents a particularly large increase for taxpayers over the age of 65;
on average, tax returns with at least one taxpayer over age 65 will pay 12
percent more tax under the 1986 tax legislation than they would otherwise have
paid.
Distributional considerations will continue to play a large role in the
public and Congressional discussions of future tax reforms. The present study
shows that it is very important to include the distributional consequences of
corporate as well as personal tax changes in the analysis of any proposed tax
reforms.
Martin Feldstein
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The distributional consequences of any proposed tax change are always a
central focus of attention and debate among policy officials and the general
public. The staffs of the Treasury and the Congressional Joint Committee on
Taxation use microeconomic simulation models based on individual tax return
data to calculate the effect of any proposed change on the distribution of
average tax burdens by income class, the numbers of gainers and losers in each
income class, etc. A major shortcoming of such analyses, however, is that
they always focus exclusively on the changes in the personal income tax. The
distributional consequences of changes in the corporate income tax are
completely ignored.1
The 1986 tax reform provides a clear example of the importance of
ignoring corporate tax changes in analyzing the distributional consequences of
tax reform. The intended effect of the tax reform is to raise corporate
income tax liabilities by approximately $25 billion a year and to reduce
individual tax liabilities by an equal amount. Although the distribution of
the proposed personal tax changes was a primary concern of the legislators as
they modified tax rates and tax rules, no attention was given to the
distributional consequences of the change in corporate taxation. This
procedure had the anomalous (and politically convenient) implication that the
individuals at each income level were projected to receive a tax reduction
even though the tax bill as a whole was designed to be revenue neutral. As
the ana1ysis of the present paper indicates, including the changes in the—2—
corporate income tax as well as the changes in the personal income tax results
in a very different picture of the distributional consequences of the 1986 tax
bill.
There has been surprisingly little attention in the public finance
literature to the problem of imputing the corporate income tax to individual
taxpayers in order to evaluate the distributional consequences of alternative
corporate tax rules. Neither the Treasury nor the staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation ever includes corporate tax changes in calculating the
distributional consequences of proposed tax legislation. Some private
analysts (e.g., Pechman, 1985; Browning and Johnson, 1979) have reflected the
corporate income tax in assessing the distribution of current tax burdens but,
as explained below, there are a number of serious problems with the methods
that they use. Other private analysts have made no attempt to reflect
corporate tax changes when evaluating the effects of past tax law changes on
the taxes paid by households at different income levels (e.g., Ott and
Dittrich, 1981).
There has, of course, been no shortage of sophisticated analysis of the
more general problem of the incidence of the corporate income tax between
capital and labor. Ever since Harberger (1962), economists have recognized
that the incidence question is a problem in general equilibrium analysis.
Subsequent work has shown how this general equilibrium approach can be made
computational with a quite disaggregated and dynamic economic model; see,
e.g., Shoven and Whalley (1972) and Kotlikoff and Summers (1986). The general
equilibrium problem of tax incidence can also be extended to a portfolio
approach that explicitly incorporates the effects of taxation on the net
riskiness of different assets (see Feldstein and Slemrod (1980)).—3—
No attempt will be made in the current paper to contribute to this
general analysis of corporate tax incidence. Nor will the present analysis
try to reflect the complex industry—specific characteristics of the 1986 Tax
Reform Act that distinguish it from a general across-the-board increase in
corporate tax liabilities. Instead, the focus will be on the technical
problems of imputing an assumed or calculated increase in the tax on capital
income to a representative sample of individual tax returns that can then be
aggregated by income class (or other attributes) to calculate the
distributional consequences of the change in capital income taxation.
One interpretation of the current analysis is that it shows how to impute
to individuals an increase in the corporate income tax on the assumption that
100 percent of the corporate tax increase is borne by capital and that all
capital bears that tax increase equally. This assumption is the basic
conclusion of Harberger (1962) for a two—sector economy in which the
elasticities of substitution between capital and labor are the same in both
sectors and equal to the elasticity of substitution between the two goods in
consumption. Harberger argues that the conclusion is at least approximately
valid under a wider range of conditions and it is probably true that this has
become the conventional wisdom among most public finance specialists.
Feldstein and Slemrod (1980) show that the introduction of risk and a
portfolio framework for analyzing tax incidence does not alter the conclusion
that an-increase in the corporate income tax would be borne exclusively by
capital income under Harberger's elasticity assumptions even though in the
Feldstein-Slemrod portfolio framework the expected rates of return are not the
same in all sectors and the change in tax does not affect all types of capital
income equally.-.4—
Those who do not believe that a change in the corporate income tax is
borne exclusively by the owners of capital can interpret the current paper as
analyzing the question of how any given increase in the tax on capital income
in general is distributed among individuals. For example, if the corporate
income tax is assumed to be borne half by capital and half by labor, the
current analysis indicates how the half borne by capital should be imputed to
individual taxpayers.
The analysis uses the NBER TAXSIM model to calculate changes in
individual tax liabilities. TAXSIM is a computer model that incorporates a
large stratified random sample of individual tax returns provided by the
Internal Revenue Service and a computer program that can calculate the tax
liability for each individual tax return for a variety of alternative tax
rules and alternative assumptions about tax incidence or taxpayer behavior.
The TAXSIM model used in the present paper incorporates 30,723 individual tax
returns for 1983, a 25 percent random sample of the stratified random sample
provided by the Internal Revenue Service.
Each tax return has been modified to make the sample an estimate of the
population of taxpayers in 1988. This involves modifying each dollar amount
in the tax return to an estimated 1988 level and reweighting the sampleto
reflect the likely growth in the number of tax returns during that interval.
The 1988 individual income tax liability for each tax return is then
calculated using the tax rules and tax rates enacted by Congress in September
1986. This serves as a base to which the corporate tax liabilities and the
change in corporate tax liabilities can be added.
Section 1 of this paper comments on the methods used by previous analysts
to impute corporate income tax liabilities. The next four sections then—5—
discuss the key issues involved in using information from the national income
and product accounts and the flow of funds accounts to impute corporate tax
changes to individual tax returns. The emphasis throughout is on finding
methods that can actually be implemented with available data.
The analysis is used in Sections 6 and 7 to impute to individual tax
returns the estimated 1988 corporate tax liability under the pre—1987 tax law
and the effect of the increase in corporate tax liabilities embodied in the
1986 legislation. These imputations are then used to compare the
conventionally measured changes in personal tax liabilities with the changes
in the combined personal and corporate tax liabilities.
1.Previous Methods of Imputing Corporate Tax Burdens
Although the analyses of the Treasury and of the Joint Committee on
Taxation do not impute corporate income tax changes to individual taxpayers,
several academic studies have presented such calculations. The work of Pechman
(1985) is perhaps the most fully developed and widely used of these
calculations.2 It is useful therefore to start with Pechman's work and then
to comment on the work of other economists who have made imputations in
order to assess the distributional consequences of changes in corporate
taxation.
Pechman emphasizes the uncertain incidence of the corporate income tax
and therefore presents imputations based on alternative assumptions about how
the incidence of the corporate income tax is divided among dividends,
property income in general, employees' compensation, and consumption.
Although my concern in the present paper is not with this general problem of-6-
tax incidence, some comments on the incidence assumptions underlying Pechman's
more detailed imputation calculations is appropriate in the current context.
It is difficult to see the rationale for allocating any portion of the
corporate tax burden on the basis of each taxpayer's total consumption. Since
no attempt is made to distinguish between the consumption of corporate and
noncorporate goods, allocation in proportion to consumption is essentially
equivalent to allocating in proportion to the labor and capital incomes that
finance that consumption. As such, it is redundant to have an imputation
based on an allocation that attributes some fraction of the corporate tax
burden to labor income, some portion to capital income and the remainder to
consumption.
Any allocation based on total consumption must ultimately rest on some
notion that the corporate income tax is embodied in the price of the product
and therefore borne by consumers. Since the theory of incidence is
essentially a theory of relative prices and factor rewards, this notion of
forward shifting only makes sense if it is assumed that an increase in the
corporate tax is accompanied by a change in monetary policy that permits the
overall price level to increase. Even if it is accepted that a rise in the
corporate income tax leads to an increase in the price level, it is difficult
to see why this should be analyzed as a tax on consumers rather than as a
reduction in real wages and real capital income.
To justify an imputation on the basis of consumption, it might be argued
that the propensity to consume is not the same at all income levels and that
the higher prices affect income that is consumed but not income that is saved.
Such an argument would be fallacious because the savings are merely postponed—7—
consumption and therefore should be assigned tax on the same basis as current
consumption.
A second possible argument for imputing a corporate tax increase on the
basis of consumption rather than capital and labor incomes is that a
significant fraction of all consumption is now financed by Social Security and
other government transfer payments rather than by factor earnings. If an
increase in the corporation tax causes the overall price level to rise,
recipients of transfer payments would ceteris paribus see their real incomes
fall. Such an analysis is misleading because Social Security benefits are
explicitly indexed to the level of consumer prices while other types of
transfer payments are likely to be adjusted by Congress in response to a rise
in the price level.
In short, it seems best to analyze the change in the corporate income tax
as a change in real factor incomes and not to be confused by a possible change
in the price level.
Pechman's allocation on the basis of dividends and of property income in
general is central to the analysis of the current paper. The assumption that
the tax rests more heavily on dividends than on other types of capital income
implies that net of tax rates of return to portfolio investors are not the
same in the corporate and noncorporate sectors. Although an assumption of
unequal net rates of return is unusual in conventional general equilibrium
incidence analysis, it is consistent with a portfolio model of tax incidence
of the type developed in Feldstein and Slemrod (1980). However, in such a
portfolio model, an increase in the corporate tax reduces the riskiness as well
as the yield on corporate securities. With a wide class of utility functions,-8-
the combination of lower risk and lower yield increases the demand for corporate
securities. The reduced net income does not adequately measure the effect of the
tax on the different types of capital income because the reduced risk of
corporate equity is a significant compensation for the reduced yield. On
balance, it is very difficult to know how to interpret an incidence assumption
that assigns a greater reduction in net yield to corporate equity than to other
types of capital income.
My concern in the current paper is not, however, with the
inappropriateness of using consumption or dividends as a base for imputing the
corporate income tax. Rather it is with the technical problems involved in
imputing to individual taxpayers the corporate tax liabilities that are
assumed to be borne by capital income in general. The method used by Pechman
for allocating the portion of the tax that he assumes is borne by capital
income in general begins by redefining the capital income of each individual
taxpayer by imputing retained earnings on the basis of that individual's
dividend income. An est4mate of the accrued capital gain in noncorporate
assets (changes in the value of business inventories, of farm assets and of
nonf arm real estate) is also imputed to each tax return. The capital income
received by nonprofit institutions and by pension funds is explicitly ignored.
The proportion of the corporate income tax that is assumed to be borne by
capital income in general is then imputed to individual tax returns on the
basis of each return's net—of-tax total capital income.
There are several serious problems with this method. First, it is wrong
to exclude the capital income received by pension funds. The vast bulk of
these funds are the assets of defined benefit plans.3 The retirement benefits—9—
received by retirees and by current employees who participate in a defined
benefit plan do not depend on changes in the rate of return earned by the
assets of the pension plan. Variations in the return on plan assets inure to
the benefit (or detriment) of the corporations that sponsor the defined
benefit plans since a rise in the net income of the plan permits thecorporate
sponsor to reduce its contributions while a fall in the plan's net rate of
return requires the corporate sponsor to increase its contributions. With
benefits independent of plan assets, the corporate tax borne by the capital
income received by defined benefit pension funds is actually borneby the
sponsoring corporations and should be allocated to individuals on the basis of
their ownership of those corporations.4 For the minority of pension funds
that are of the defined contribution type, the individual pension plan
participants would bear the increase in the corporate tax. Since pension
assets are now more than 1.7 trillion dollars, excluding their share of the
corporate tax burden is a serious omission.
A second important problem with the method of Pechman and others is that
it does not distinguish between real capital income and nominal capital
income. The basic theory of incidence tells us that the rate of return is
equal on all types of capital and that an increase in the corporate income tax
reduces real income in proportion to the real capital income of each taxpayer.
This has several important implications. Net interest income must be
redefined as real interest income. The retained earnings that are imputed to
individual taxpayers should be the real retained earnings of corporations,
defined in a way that reflects the inventory valuation adjustment, the capital
consumption adjustment and the inflation—induced erosion of the net corporate-10—
debt. The imputation of changes in the value of inventories, farm assets and
nonf arm real estate should be purged of their inflation component. When that
is done, the remaining year to year fluctuations in asset values are only
transitory changes that should not be included in the definition of capital
income for the current purpose.
A third issue is that an increase in the tax paid by corporations
automatically reduces dividends and other types of income taxable at the
personal level. To the extent that dividends are reduced, shareholders pay
less personal tax. To the extent that retained earnings are reduced, accrued
capital gains decline and subsequent personal capital gains taxes fall. These
automatic reductions in personal tax payments offset in part the higher
corporate tax burden imputed to these individuals. These changes in personal
tax burdens must be reflected in the calculations of the distribution of the
changes in total tax burdens.
Finally, it is not clear what justification there is for Pechman's
procedure allocating the general tax on capital income on the basis of the
net-of-personal-tax capital income rather than on the pre-personal-tax capital
income. Conventional incidence analysis would say that two individuals with
the same capital assets would bear the same amount of the corporate income tax
regardless of any difference in their personal tax rates. Pechman's method
would apparently give an individual in the 50 percent personal tax bracket
only two-thirds of the corporate tax burden assigned to an individual in the
25 percent tax bracket even though both individuals owned the same amount of
capital assets.
I have discussed the method of Pechman and his collaborators because it
has produced some of the most important and often-cited figures on the—11—
distribution of tax burdens and effective tax rates. It is clear however from
these criticisms that the Pechman method may be seriously misleading.
The shortcomings of the Pechman method are not avoided in the other
studies of the distribution of tax liabilities. Browning and Johnson (1975)
also fail to distinguish between real and nominal capital income, disregard
the capital income of pension plans, and do not reflect the fact that
increased corporate tax liabilities lower the personal tax base.
Although there are other studies of the distribution of the corporate tax
liabilities,5 none of these deals with the problems raised here in a
satisfactory way. The remainder of the present paper is an attempt to improve
on the current methods.
2.Imputation of a Tax on Capital Income: A First Approximation
It is useful to begin by ignoring the issues of corporate pensions,
inflation adjustments and the second—round response of dividends and capital
gains. With these simplifying assumptions, imputing a change in capital
taxation involves three calculations. First, the total capital income
attributable to individuals in a base year must be calculated. The
calculations in this paper use 1985, the most recent year for which national
income data are now available. Second, this must be extrapolated to 1988, the
year for which the tax increase is to be analyzed. Finally, a rule must be
adopted for imputing corporate retained earnings to individual tax returns.
2.1 Total Attributable Capital Income
The most recent National Income and Product Accounts (as of July 1986)
estimate that total corporate profits before tax, with the inventory—12—
valuations adjustment (IVA) and the capital consumption adjustment (CCA), were
$280.7 billion in 1985. This figure includes $16.8 billion of "prof its" made
by the Federal Reserve Bank. When these are excluded, the total private
corporate profits before tax are $263.9 billion. Further adjustments in this
figure will be made in subsequent sections but this $263.9 billion will
represent total pre-tax profits for the present section.
The relevant concept of interest income for our current purpose is the
net interest income of persons. The national income accounts indicate 1985
personal interest income of $476.2 billion. Against this must be offset the
$145.1 billion interest paid on mortgages and the other personal interest paid
to business of $82.6.billion. The net interest income of households is
therefore $248.5 billion. Subsequent sections will adjust this for the
effects of inflation and for the fraction of "individual" interest income that
actually goes to private pensions.
A third component of the capital income of individuals is rental income.
The national income accounts estimate the 1985 net rental income of
individuals as $7.6 billion (with the capital consumption adjustment),
including the imputed rental income on owner-occupied housing. Any rental
income of corporations is treated as part of corporate profits. Since this
net rental income is net of the $145.1 billion of mortgage interest that
has already been subtracted in calculating net interest income, that
amount must be added back to calculate the proper rental figure (and to avoid
subtracting the interest paid twice): the relevant rental income amount is
therefore $152.7 billion.
There is a final remaining category of individual income that represents
a mixture of labor income and capital income: proprietors' incomes in farm—13—
and nonf arm establishments. Approximately ninety percent of the $254 billion
of proprietors' income is attributed by the Commerce Department to nonfarm
establishments. These include professional practices (law, medicine,
dentistry, etc.), small unincorporated service businesses (restaurants,
drycleaning firms, etc.), and other types of establishments with very low
capital requirements relative to their labor costs. It is difficult to
estimate what fraction of the total proprietor's income should be classified
as capital income and even more difficult to impute this relative small amount
to individual tax returns. The present analysis makes the simplifying
assumption of ignoring the capital income in these establishments.6
2.2 Extrapolation to 1988
The three categories of capital income received by individuals either
directly or as corporate shareholders --privatecorporate profits, net
interest, and rental income -—totaled$665.1 billion in 1985. This total
must be extrapolated to 1988 in a way that is at least approximately
consistent with the Treasury's estimate of the corporate tax liability under
the old and new tax laws. The items that appear on the personal income tax
form must also be extrapolated in a comparable way.
This extrapolation from 1985 to 1988 is based on the mid-year review
forecasts prepared by the Reagan administration in August 1986 (Executive
Office of the President, 1986). Unfortunately, the published detail is not
adequate to permit a full item—by—item extrapolation of the 1985 income and
expenses to 1988. Instead, the present analysis follows the August 1986
off ical mid-year review and assumes that aggregate corporate profits and-14-
dividends rise by 59.6 percent between 1985 and 1988 and that aggregate
interest and rental income income increases by 16.6 percent. The implied 1988
total private pretax capital income is $889.0 billion. The individual tax
return items in the TAXSIM return are first extrapolated from 1983 (the year
of the actual tax returns) to 1985 (the most recent year for which national
account data are available) on the basis of the observed changes in aggregate
figures and the assumption that the number of tax returns increases by 1.9
percent per year. These 1985 figures are then extrapolated to 1988 by using
the mid-year review forecasts of the administration.7
The estimated corporate income tax in 1988 and the corresponding proposed
increase is based on the published projections of the Treasury. These
published Treasury projections are for fiscal years rather than the calendar
years needed for integration with the individual income tax simulations.
Adjusting from fiscal to calender years implies an estimate of approximately
$95 billion of "baseline" 1988 corporate tax revenue under the pre-reform tax
law and an increase of $25 billion due to the tax reform.
2.3 Imputing the Corporate Income Tax to Individuals
The projected $95 billion corporate tax liability for 1988 is equivalent
to 10.7 cents of tax liability per dollar of the $889.0 billion of total
private pretax capital income. This figure, which is the increase in the
effective tax rate on all capital income caused by the corporate income tax,
will be central in imputing the baseline old-law corporate tax liability.
Subtracting the $95 billion baseline tax liability from the projected
$889 billion total pretax capital income implies a total net capital income of—15—
$794 billion net of the baseline corporate tax but before the personal tax.
The $25 billion projected increase in the corporate income tax is equal to
3.1 cents per dollar of this net capital income. Imputing the $25 billion
increase in the corporate income tax is equivalent to assigning this tax rise
of 3.1 cents per dollar of total net capital income to each individual
taxpayer.
Note that this method implies that the baseline corporate income tax is
allocated among individuals on the assumption that in the absence of the
corporate income tax all forms of capital income would have the same rate of
return and that the corporate income tax reduces that rate of return equally
on all types of investments. The imputation of the increase in the corporate
income tax therefore starts with the assumption that the net-of-corporate tax
return to corporate equity is the same as the return to debt and to real
property.8
Although a tax of 10.7 cents can be imputed per dollar of capital income
in general and of interest income in particular, the tax to be imputed per
dollar of dividend income must be adjusted to reflect the tax borne by the
associated retained earnings. The national income accounts indicate that in
1985 dividends were $81.6 billion and pretax corporate profits were $263.9
billion. Extrapolating these to 1988 yields dividends of $130.2 billion and
pretax private corporate profits of $421.2 billion. Thus in imputing the tax
to individual returns on the basis of dividends, each dollar of dividends
represents $3.23 of pretax corporate profits. Similarly, each dollar of
dividend income represents $2.50 of post-corporate-tax corporate profits.
These figures can be used to allocate the corporate tax liabilities on the
basis of the dividend income reported on individual tax returns.-16-
More specifically, since the $95 billion of corporate tax liability under
current law is equivalent to 10.7 cents per dollar of pretax capital income,
the tax borne by corporate equity capital is equivalent to 0.107 x $3.23 =
0.346dollars of tax liability per dollar of dividend income. Moreover, since
the $25 billion tax increase is equivalent to 3.1 cents per dollar of
corporate profits net of the corporate income tax, the proposed increase in
corporate tax liabilities that is borne by corporate equity is equivalent to
0.031 x $2.50 =0.078dollars of increased tax liability per dollar of
dividend income.
These calculations, summarized in column 1 of Table 1, provide the
figures required for the "first approximation" imputation of the $95 billion
baseline current—law corporate tax liability in 1988 and of the $25 billion
increase in the tax on capital income. To represent the baseline corporate
tax, for each individual tax return in the TAXSIM model, a taxof34.6 cents
would be imputed per dollar of dividend and 10.7 cents per dollar of net
interest and of rental income.9 Similarly, the "first approximation"
imputation of the $25 billion corporate tax increase requires imputing a tax
of 7.8 cents per dollar of dividend income and a tax of 3.1 cents per dollar
of net interest income and net rental income.
Although this would provide the basis for a "first approximation"
imputation of the corporate tax, I will not pursue these figures but turn
instead to developing an imputation that deals more appropriately with
pensions, inflation and the automated response of dividends to corporate tax
liabilities.—17—
3.The Income of Corporate Pension Plans
The national income accounts treat corporate pension plans as part of the
household sector. As such, the dividends and interest received by corporate
pension plans are treated as if they are received by individuals. Since that
income is not taxable, the method of imputation described in Section 2
essentially ignores the tax burden that falls on the capital income of these
pension plans. This is equivalent to assuming that the pensions do bear their
proportionate share of the increased tax on capital income but that it is not
assignable to any individuals.
As I noted in Section 1, this procedure, which is explicitly adopted by
Pechman (1985), is not appropriate. The correct procedure depends on the
nature of the pension plan. In a defined contribution plan, employers make
prescribed annual contributions but the employees' ultimate level of benefits
depends on the yield earned on the accumulated plan assets. The TIAA-CREF
plan and other plans used at most academic institutions are defined
contribution plans. In a defined benefit plan, employers promise a specific
retirement benefit (typically related to years of service and earnings in
final years before retirement); fluctuations in the yield on the pension
assets influence the amount that the employers have to contribute to finance
those promised benefits but do not affect the level of benefits that employees
receive.'0
The taxes borne by the assets of defined contribution plans should be
imputed to the employees for whom those assets have been accumulated.
Individual retirement accounts, self-employment retirement accounts (Keogh
plans) and 401k employee saving plans should all be treated in this same way.—18—
Unfortunately, no information about any of these assets is available on
individual tax returns.
The present analysis will therefore treat all pension assets as if they
were the assets of defined benefit plans. Although about two-thirds of total
pension assets are in fact in defined benefit plans,11 this simplification will
distort the imputation of the taxes borne by pension assets. It is
nevertheless better to treat all pensions as defined benefit plans than to
ignore the taxes borne by pension assets.
The tax that is attributable to pension assets in defined benefit plans
is thus assumed here to be borne by the corporate sponsor of those plans. To
impute this to individual taxpayers, the calculations of Section 2 must be
modified by increasing the private corporate profits by the amount of the
interest income attributable to the pension assets and by modifying the amount
of retained earnings per dollar of dividends actually received by
individuals.
More specifically, in 1985 private pension plans received $11.2 billion
of dividends and $51.8 billion of interest.'2 The dividend income of pension
funds is already counted as part of total private corporate profits. To
estimate adjusted corporate profits, it is therefore only necessary to add the
$51.8 billion of interest to the previously calculated $263.9 billion profits
to obtain adjusted corporate profits of $315.7 billion. In addition, the
dividend income of individuals is reduced by $11.2 billion (from $81.6
billion to $70.4 billion) and the net interest income is reduced by $51.8
billion (from $248.5 billion to $196.7 billion).
Extrapolating these amounts to 1988 implies total capital income of
$911.2 billion, adjusted corporate profits of $503.9 billion and personal-19—
dividends of $112.4 billion. Based on these figures, the $95 billion of
baseline corporate income tax is equivalent to 10.4 cents per dollar of pretax
capital income and the $25 billion 1988 tax increase is equivalent to a tax
increase of 3.1 cents per dollar of net capital income.
The reduction in "personal dividend income" (i.e., dividends not paid to
corporations or to pension plans) raises both the baseline tax per dollar of
true personal dividend income and the tax increase per dollar of true dividend
income. The adjustments imply that there are $503.9 billion of corporate
profits and $112.4 billion of adjusted dividends or $4.48 of adjusted private
pretax corporate profits per dollar of personal dividends. Similarly,
adjusted net-of—tax private corporate profits are $503.9 billion minus $95
billion or $408.9 billion, implying $3.64 of net profit per dollar of
dividends.
With a baseline corporate tax of 10.4 cents per dollar of total capital
income, the implied tax burden attributable on the basis of personal dividends
received is 10.4 x 4.48 =46.6cents of baseline corporate tax per dollar of
personal dividend income. Similarly, with a $25 billion tax increase
corresponding to 3.1 cents of additional tax per dollar of capital income, the
tax burden per dollar of dividends received by individuals rises by 3.1
cents x 3.64 =11.3cents per dollar of dividends instead of the 7.8 cents
reported in the previous section. These figures are summarized in column 2 of
Table 1.Table 1




First Pension and Inflation
Approxi mat ion ImputationAdjustment
Billions of 1988 Dollars
(1) Total pretax private capital income 889.0 911.2 707.5
(2) Baseline corporate tax liability 95.0 95.0 95.0
(3) Total baseline net private capital income794.0 816.2 612.5
(4) Projected corporate tax increase 25.0 25.0 250
(5) Pretax corporate profits 421.2 503.9 498.6
(6) Personal dividends 130.2 112.4 112.4
Dollars
(A) Baseline tax per dollar of total
pretax capital income E(2)+(1)] 0.107 0.104 0.134
(B) Corporate tax increase per dollar
of baseline net capital income ((4)+(3)] 0.031 0.031 0.041
(C) Pretax corporate profits per
dollar of dividends ((6)+(5)] 3.23 4.48 4.44
(0) Corporate profits net of baseline tax
per dollar of dividends [(6)÷{(5)—(2)}] 2.50 3.64 3.59
(E) Baseline corporate tax per dollar of
dividends [(A)x(C)] 0.346 0.466 0.594
(F) Corporate tax increase per dollar of
dividends [(B)x(D)] 0.078 0.113 0.147
See text for more complete definitions and for description of methods of
calculation. All figures refer to 1988 projection.-20-
4. Inflation Adjustments and Real Capital Income
The calculations of Sections 2 and 3, as well as the imputations
presented by all previous researchers, fail to distinguish between real
capital income and nominal capital income. More specifically, although the
capital consumption adjustments make the profit and rent estimates reflect
inflation-adjusted depreciation, the interest income and expenses are nominal
amounts. Since the theory of incidence clearly requires the calculations to
be done in terms of real capital incomes, the past procedure is incorrect. It
distorts the measurement not only of the net interest income of individual
taxpayers but also of corporate profits (by overstating net interest costs)
and of pension income (by overstating interest income).
The present section shows how to correct the different components of
interest income and expenses for inflation in order to obtain a more
appropriate imputation of changes in capital income. Consider first the
interest income and expenses of the household sector.13 The interest income
can be converted from a nominal amount to the corresponding real amount by
multiplying the nominal interest income by the ratio of the effective real
interest rate to the nominal interest rate implicit in the reported interest
income. The implicit nominal interest rate can be estimated on the basis of
the composition of the household sector's taxable interest bearing assets.'4
The Flow of Funds tables report that in 1985 the household sector held 61.8
percent of these assets in traditional savings accounts, small time deposits
or NOW accounts, 15.6 percent in money market mutual funds or in other forms
that would pay a short—term market rate of interest, 7.9 percent in long—term
corporate bonds and 14.7 percent in long-term government bonds; no attempt has—21—
been made to reflect differences in the composition of these assets among
income classes.
In 1985, the yield on short-term money market accounts (represented by
the six month commercial paper rate) was 8.0 percent. Corporate Baa bonds had
a yield of 12.7 percent while government 10 year bonds had a yield of 10.6
percent. The typical rate on traditional savings accounts was five percent.
When these interest rates are combined using the portfolio weights described
in the previous paragraph, the nominal interest rate on household taxable
interest bearing assets was 6.9 percent.
Since the consumer price index rose 3.7 percent between December 1984 and
December 1985, the corresponding real interest rate was (1.069/1.037) -1=
0.03.15This implies that the ratio of the real interest rate to the nominal
interest income in 1985 was 0.031/0.069 =0.45.This is the factor that is
used to convert nominal interest income to real interest income. It implies
that the nominal personal interest income of $476.2 billion in 1985
corresponds to real interest income of only $214.3 billion.
A corresponding calculation must be done to convert the nominal personal
interest payments to business into a real amount. The Flow of Funds accounts
indicate that 63.3 percent of the personal debt consists of nonf arm mortgages,
27.7 percent is consumer credit and the remaining 9.0 percent is a
miscellaneous collection that includes loans, trade credit and unpaid
insurance premiums. The interest rate for outstanding home mortgages, taken
to be an average of the new home mortgage rates for each of the past 15
years,16 was 10.4 percent for 1985. The interest rate on consumer credit in
1985 is assumed to average 18 percent. Finally, the remaining category of—22—
loans and other personal liabilities is taken to carry an interest rate equal
to 2 percent over the prime rate or 12 percent. The combined average rate of
interest on the personal debt including mortgage debt was therefore 12.6
percent.
Applying the 3.7 percent rate of inflation in the same way here as
applied to nominal interest rates on household interest bearing assets implies
that the real pretax interest rate on household debt was 8.5 percent and
therefore that the ratio of the real interest yield to the nominal coupon
interest rate on household sector debt in 1985 was 0.67. Applying this factor
to the $227.7 billion of interest that individuals paid to businesses and on
mortgages in 1985 implies a corresponding real interest expense of only $152.6
billion.
Combining the estimated real interest income and real interest expenses
for 1985 implies that the net interest income of the household sector in 1984
was not the $248.3 billion used in the previous sections but only $61.7
billion.
An inflation correction also changes the estimated value of the interest
income of corporate pensions. Since the fixed income assets of pensions are
generally long—term securities (bonds and mortgages), it is reasonable to
estimate the nominal yield on these securities as the rate on Baa corporate
bonds, 12.7 percent. With an inflation rate of 3.7 percent, only 68 percent
of the interest income of pensions was real interest income. Applying this
ratio to the interest income of pension funds implies that their real interest
income was not the $51.8 billion reported in the previous section but only
$35.2 billion. Subtracting this from $61.7 billion of total household net—23—
real interest income leaves $26.5 billion of net real interest income received
by individuals.
Finally there is the problem of adjusting corporate profits for the
inflationary effects on nominal corporate assets and liabilities. The IVA and
CCA already adjust inventory gains and depreciation for changes in the price
level. The immediately previous paragraph describes how pension interest
income that is included in the adjusted corporate profits must be decreased.
What remains to be taken into account is the inflation erosion of the
corporate debt.17 The inflation erosion of the corporate net debt is estimated
for this purpose as 0.037 times the net fixed-income liabilities of the
corporate sector measured at market value.18 The estimated net debt erosion of
$13.3 is then added to the previously measured corporate profits..
With the adjustments described in this section and the previous ones, the
final estimate of the adjusted pretax corporate profits for 1985 becomes:
(1) the private corporate profits with the IVA and CCA, $263.9; plus (2) $35.2
billion of inflation adjusted interest income received by corporate pension
plans; plus (3) $13.3 billion of decline in the market value of corporate debt
caused by inflation. The total adjusted real corporate profits is thus $312.4
in 1985.
Adding to this the $152.7 billion net rental income of the household sector
(which is already adjusted for inflation) and the $26.5 billion net real
interest income of individuals yields a total adjusted real capital income of
$491.6 billion for 1985.
Extrapolating these real income figures to 1988 implies total real
capital income of $707.5 billion, real adjusted corporate profits of $498.6—24—
billion and real net interest income of $30.9 billion. 1988 dividends remain
unchanged from the previous section at $112.4 billion.
These figures, summarized in column 3 of Table 1, imply that the baseline
$95 billion tax is equivalent to 13.4 cents per dollar of real capital income.
Since there are $4.44 of profits per dollar of dividends, the baseline
corporate tax burden on shareholders is equivalent to 59.4 cents per dollar of
dividends (13.4 x 4.44).
Similarly, since net capital income is $612.5 billion (i.e., $707.5
billion minus $95 billion of tax), the $25 billion tax increase is equivalent
to 4.1 cents per dollar of net capital income. With $3.59 of net profits per
dollar of dividends, the corporate tax increase on shareholders is equivalent
to 14.7 cents per dollar of dividends (4.1 x 3.59).
Before looking at the implications of these adjustments for the
distribution of the increased tax burden, the next section considers a final
problem: the response of dividends and retained earnings to the increase in
the corporate tax.
5. Automatic Changes in Taxable Personal Income
A rise in corporate tax payments automatically reduces taxable personal
income. To the extent that the higher corporate tax payments are borne by
corporate capital, firms must reduce dividends or retained earnings or both.
Whatever the response, it implies an automatic reduction in the personal taxes
paid by individuals. A reduction in dividends reduces personal taxable income
directly and therefore the personal tax on that income. A reduction in
retained earnings lowers the value of the share price and therefore ultimately—25—
reduces capital gains and the taxes on those gains. To the extent that higher
corporate tax payments are borne by other types of capital, they reduce the
return on that capital and therefore the corresponding income at the personal
level.
The conventional revenue estimation procedure ignores the effect of
corporate tax increases on personal tax liabilities and therefore overstates
the revenue effect of raising corporate taxes. As the calculations below
indicate, the magnitude of this effect can be quite substantial.
To make this adjustment operational, the reduction in capital income due
to the corporate income tax must be divided between corporate capital income
and noncorporate capital income. The simplest assumption, and the one adopted
here, is that the gross of tax capital incomes of the corporate and
noncorporate sectors remain constant (as they would in the classical Harberger
unit elasticity economy), implying that corporate sector net capital income
falls by the full amount of the corporate tax. Note that this does not imply
that the tax is borne just by corporate shareholders. The rate of return
falls by the same amount on all types of capital. But the shift in the
capital stock from the corporate sector to the noncorporate sector is just
enough (given the assumption of Unit elasticities) to maintain the capital
income of the noncorporate sector and to reduce the corporate sector capital
income by the full amount of the corporate tax.
The decline in corporate sector net income must also be divided between a
reduction of dividends and a reduction of retained earnings. Econometric
studies of dividend behaviour (e.g., Lintner (1956) and Feldstein (1970))
imply that dividends adjust to net profits gradually but with a long—run—26—
response that maintains the same ratio of dividends to net earnings unless the
changes in tax rules alter the relative cost of dividends and retained
earnings. Although the 1986 reduction in marginal personal income tax rates
and the accompanying rise in capital gains rates both increase the relative
attractiveness of dividends, reflecting the likely corporate response to this
change would go beyond the nonbehavioural character of the current analysis.
But a reduction of dividends and, retained earnings is forced upon firms by
their reduction in net earnings and cannot be ignored even in an analysis that
does not attempt to include the response of economic agents to changes in
relative prices.
In this spirit, it is appropriate to assume that firms adjust dividends
and retained earnings in a way that maintains an unchanged ratio of dividends
to real retained earnings. For this purpose, retained earnings must be based
on economic profits with the capital consumption adjustment and the
inventory valuation adjustment. In addition, these profits must be adjusted by
adding the product of the inflation rate and the outstanding net corporate
debt. When this calculation is done for each year in the decade from 1976
through 1985, the ratio of dividends to the sum of dividends and adjusted
retained earnings is 0.475.
Dividing the $95 billion 1988 baseline corporate tax liability into
dividends and retained earnings in this ratio implies that the baseline
corporate tax reduces 1988 dividends by $45.1 billion and retained earnings by
$49.9 billion. Similarly, the $25 billion rise in corporate tax receipts
would reduce dividends by $11.9 billion and retained earnings by $13.1
billion.—27—
Since the total projected dividends at the 1988 level are $112.4 billion,
the preexisting tax reduces dividends at the rate of 401 cents per dollar of
projected 1988 dividends and reduces retained earnings by 44.4 cents per
dollar of projected 1988 dividends. Similarly, the projected $25 billion rise
in corporate taxes imply that dividends will be reduced by 10.6 cents per
dollar of dividends and that retained earnings would be reduced by 11.6 cents
per dollar of dividends.
The remaining difficulty in calculating the resulting change in personal
tax liabilities is deciding how much tax to associate with the change in
retained earnings. There are two issues. Each dollar of retained earnings
may raise the share value by less than a dollar (as emphasized by Bradford
(1981) and others). Moreover, the delay in realizing capital gains and the
possibility of avoiding taxable realization alto9ether by bequeathing the
appreciated stock mean that the effective tax rate is less than the statutory
rate on capital gains. The calculations in this paper assume that each
individual's effective rate of tax on the dollars of retained earnings is
equal to one half of that individual's capital gains tax rate.
6. Imputing the Baseline Corporate Income Tax
It is now possible to summarize the effects of the $95 billion 1988
corporate income tax and to present the simulation results on the effect of
that tax on the distribution of tax liabilities.
The calculations that have been presented imply that the $95 billion
baseline corporate income tax in 1988 has four effects:—28-
(1)It reduces dividends by 40.1 cents per dollar of dividends reported by
individual taxpayers;
(2) It reduces retained earnings by 44.4 cents per dollar of dividends
reported by individual taxpayers;
(3)It implies an additional corporate tax liability of 59.4 cents per dollar
of dividends; and
(4) It implies an additional corporate tax liability of 13.4 cents per dollar
of real interest income.
These estimates are now used in conjunction with the TAXSIM program to
calculate the effect of the baseline $95 billion corporate tax on each
individual in the TAXSIM sample. This analysis calculates two basic measures:
the effect of the corporate income tax on personal tax liabilities and the
extra imputed burden of the corporate tax.
The calculation of the effect of the corporate income tax on individual
tax liabilities starts with a projection of 1988 personal income tax
liabilities for each individual in the TAXSIM sample under the tax law enacted
in 1986 ("the new tax law"). Recall that, as noted in Section 2.2, for this
purpose the TAXSIM sample of tax returns is reweighted to represent the growth
in the number of potential tax returns by 1988 and the dollar amounts are
rescaled to reflect the projected growth in nominal GNP and its components
between 1985 and 1988. The TAXSIM program contains the rate schedule and tax
rules (as far as possible) of the new tax law enacted in 1986.
The effect of the corporate tax on personal income tax liabilities is
calculated by adding to each individual's reported dividend income an amount-29—
equal to 40.1. cents -per dollar of reported dividend income and to each
individual's long-term capital gain an amount equal to 44.4 cents per dollar
of reported dividend income. The individual's total tax bill is then
recalculated for this expanded measure of income using the rules and rates of
the new tax law. The difference between this enlarged tax bill and the
baseline tax bill for 1988 is an estimate of the extent to which the baseline
corporate tax reduces personal tax liabilities.
In the aggregate the $95 billion corporation income tax reduces personal
tax liabilities by $13.4 billion. That is, without the corporate income tax,
1988 personal tax liabilities would be $13.4 billion higher than with the
baseline $95 billion corporate tax.
Each individual's share of the $95 billion corporate tax burden is
calculated by attributing to the individual an imputed burden of 134 cents
per dollar of real net interest income19 and 59.4 cents per dollar of
dividends. For this purpose, what matters is not the interest and dividends
that individuals report for tax purposes but the actual amount of interest and
dividends that they receive. Studies by the Department of Commerce (Park,
1986) indicate that individuals include in adjusted gross income only about 82
percent of the nominal interest income that they receive and about 71 percent
of the dividends that they receive. The imputation therefore begins by
grossing up dividends and nominal interest by dividing reported dividends by
0.71 and reported interest by 0.82. The imputed burden of 59.4 cents per
dollar of dividends is then calculated using this more accurate measure of
true dividend income. Similarly the imputation of 13.4 cents per dollar of
real net interest income is imputed on the basis of the real income estimated
using the more accurate measure of total nominal interest income.20-30—
In the aggregate, the amount of corporate tax imputed to individuals by
the present method is $60.7 billion or 64 percent of the total $95 billion
corporate tax liability. The remaining 36 percent is borne primarily by
nontaxable owners of capital, by trusts and other fiduciary accounts, and by
foreign investors.
Table 2 shows the distribution of these imputed changes in personal tax
liabilities and total tax burdens. The individual tax returns in the TAXSIM
model are weighted by the estimated 1988 weights and then grouped according to
adjusted gross income under the rules of the new tax law. Column 1 shows the
estimated number of returns in each category. Column 2 shows the average
personal income tax liability at each income level under the new tax law.
Column 3 shows the additional personal tax liability that would have been
borne had the corporate income tax not reduced dividends and retained
earnings. Column 4 shows the imputed tax burden that represents each
individual's share of the $95 billion tax on capital income.
Column 5 summarizes these impacts by showing the net effect of the
corporate tax (column 4 minus column 3) as a percentage of the tax burden that
would have existed in the absence of the corporate income tax (column 2 plus
column 3). The numerator of column 5 is thus the unobserved tax burden on
capital income caused by the corporate income tax minus the savings in
personal taxes that result from the reduced dividends and capital gains. The
denominator is the tax that would have been paid in the absence of the
corporate tax, i.e., the sum of the actual personal tax and the reduction in
personal taxes caused by the existing corporate tax. The result for the
lowest income class is not shown because the percentage change is distorted by






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The impact. of the corporate tax on individual tax burdens is relatively
greatest among taxpayers in the lowest and highest income groups. The
relatively substantial impact among higher income taxpayers is easy enough to
understand since it is this group that holds the preponderance of corporate
equity and fixed income securities. Among taxpayers with more than $200,000
of 1988 income, the average personal tax liability is $122,400 and the
baseline corporate tax increases that liability by an average of $27,840. The
individual percentage increases in tax liabilities averaged 21 percent among
this group of taxpayers. Even in the next two income groups, the corporate
tax increased tax liabilities by more than 10 percent.
Middle income taxpayers have relatively little capital income and
therefore experience only modest increases in tax liability because of the
corporate income tax. The taxpayers with incomes between $30,000 and $75,000
have increases that averaged less than 5 percent of their personal tax
liabilities.
Although the avera9e corporate tax burden per taxpayer is smaller in the
lower income groups, the percentage increase in the tax burden is greater
because of the progressive character of the personal income tax. Indeed, the
figures in Table 2 understate the relative increase in the tax burden among
lower income taxpayers because the calculation of the percentage increases in
column 5 excludes taxpayers with zero or negative individual income tax
burdens. It is nevertheless striking that among taxpayers with incomes of
$10,000 to $20,000 the corporate income tax raises the net tax burden per
taxpayer by $278 or 26 percent of the average personal tax liability of $958.
Among those with incomes less than $10,000, the corporate tax burden averages
$113 or more than twice times the average individual income tax liability.-32-
The aggregate estimates shown in the last line of the table indicate that
the corporate taxes imputed to individual tax returns totals $60.7 billion or
64 percent of the $95 billion to be allocated. The remainder is borne by
foreign investors and nontaxable institutions since the portion borne by
pension funds has been attributed back to shareholders.
7. Imputing the Increase in Corporate Taxes
A calcu'ation similar to that of the previous section permits an analysis
of who bears the increased corporate tax liability and how recognition of the
corporate tax alters the measured distributional effects of the 1986 tax
legislation.
The calculations presented in sections 4 and 5 imply that the $25 billion
increase in the 1988 corporate income tax has the following effects: First,
it reduces dividends by 10.6 cents per dollar of dividends received by
individual taxpayers and retained earnings by 11.6 cents per dollar of
dividends received by individual taxpayers. Second, it implies an additional
corporate tax liability of 14.7 cents per dollar of dividends and 4.1 cents
per dollar of real interest income.
The reduction of dividends and retained earnings implies that the
increase in the corporate tax liabilities reduces personal tax liabilities by
$2.8 billion. Taken by itself, this would imply that the tax package would
not be revenue neutral if the $25 billion of corporate income tax increase was
matched by $25 billion cut in personal tax revenue as conventionally
calculated but would instead cause a revenue shortfall of $2.8 billion.
Table 3 compares the distribution of the imputed changes in corporate tax



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































from those of Table 1 for several reasons: they are based on net post-tax
capital income, they reflect the induced changes in dividends and retained
earnings, etc.
Column 1 repeats the number of returns in each income class and column 2
repeats the projected 1988 personal tax liability at each income level based
on the new personal income tax law but ignoring the effect of the change in
corporate taxes. Column 3 shows the reduction in that personal tax liability
that results from the decrease in dividends and retained earnings caused by
the $25 billion rise in corporate tax liabilities. This is calculated by
reducing dividend income by 106 cents per dollar of received dividend income
(and adjusting this amount for the average extent of underreporting) and
reducing capital gains by one half of 11.6 cents per dollar of dividend
income.
Column 4 shows the increase in the imputed tax burden that is caused by
the $25 billion rise in corporate taxes. This is calculated for each return
as 5.6 cents per dollar of real net interest income received and 20.2 cents
per dollar of dividend income received. The net impact of these two effects
as a percentage of personal tax is reported in column 5 (i.e., the average of
the figures summarized in column 4 minus those of column 3 divided by
column 2).
The corporate tax increase has only a small impact among middle income
taxpayers but has a larger impact at both ends of the distribution. This
pattern follows that of Table 2. Among top income taxpayers, the corporate
tax change is equivalent to a 6 percent rise in personal tax liabilities,
virtually the same as the proportionate tax increase among taxpayers with-34—
incomes between $10,000 and $20,000. In the lowest income group the increase
in the corporate tax is almost as large as the remaining personal tax.
The figures in column 5 are a correct representation of the corporate tax
increase as a percentage of the personal tax liability but not of the
percentage increase in the individual's total tax liability. Column 6
therefore relates the extra tax due to the 1988 corporate tax increase to the
combined personal and baseline corporate tax. The effect is to reduce the
percentage increases due to the corporate tax (since the denominator is always
larger) but not to change the overall implication of a substantial
proportional tax increase with the largest increases at the top and bottom of
the income distribution.
The present analysis also makes it possible to compare the conventionally
estimated changes in personal tax liabilities with the estimated changes in
total tax burdens that takes into account the changes in the corporate as well
as the personal taxes. This is done in Table 4.
Column 2 of Table 4 shows the personal tax liability in 1988 under the
"old law" (i.e., the law prevailing through December 1986). Column 3 presents
the corresponding personal tax liability in 1988 under a fully phased—in
specification of the "new law" as it would be conventionally calculated with
no allowance for the effect of the change in the corporate tax. The fourth
column shows the conventional average tax change at each income level, column
3 minus column 2. This is restated as a percentage of the "old law" tax
liability in column 5.
The total tax changes reported in the final row of the table show that









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































personal tax rules and rates reduces projected 1988 personal tax liabilities
by only $300 million, nothing like the $25 billion personal tax cut estimated
by the staffs of the Treasury and the Joint Committee on Taxation. There are
several possible reasons for this difference. A primary reason may be that
the current TAXSIM estimates are based on the 1983 individual taxpayer file
while the Treasury and Joint Committee estimates were based on individual tax
returns for 1981. Between 1981 and 1983 individual taxpayer behavior was
changed significantly as a result of the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act. Two
important behavioral changes were the substantial increases in tax shelter
activities and realized capital gains. By virtually eliminating such tax
shelter activities and raising the tax rate on capital gains, the 1986 tax
changes therefore represent a larger increase in potential tax revenue than
would appear using the 1981 individual tax returns. Another possible source
of the difference is that the government revenue estimates reflect unspecified
behavioral changes attributable to the new tax rules. For example,
individuals may be assumed to shift borrowing from nondeductible to deductible
forms and to cut the realization of capital gains. Such behavioral changes,
which would increase the effective tax cut implied by the 1986 legislation,
are not reflected in the TAXSIM analysis.This may be particularly important
since the TAXSIM calculations are based on a fully phased-in version of the
new tax law.
The proportional tax changes shown in column 5 indicate that the TAXSIM
estimates are similar to the government projections for taxpayers with incomes
under $50,000 but then differ substantially. TAXSIM calculations imply that
the average tax liabilities of taxpayers with incomes between $50,000 and-36-
$75,000 are essentially unchan9ed while the average tax liabilities of
taxpayers with incomes over $75,000 are actually increased. This is
consistent with the explanatior of the reasons for the a9gregate differences
discussed in the previous paragraph.
The substantial difference between the TAXSIM and government estimates of
the tax reduction clearly deserves more attention than is possible in the
current study.22 The emphasis here will be on the difference between the
estimated personal tax changes and the estimated changes when corporate as
well as personal tax changes are imputed to individual tax returns.
Column 6 combines the personal tax under the "old law" from column 2 with
the additional personal tax induced by the baseline corporate tax (column 4 of
Table 2). Thus column 6 is the TAXSIM estimate of the total personal plus
corporate tax under the "old law".
Column 7 is the corresponding estimate under the new law. It combines
the individual income tax liability under the new law (column 3) with the
baseline corporate tax (column 4 of Table 2) and the net change in the
corporate tax (column 4 minus column 3 of Table 3).
The net change in the combined personal and corporate tax liabilities is
reported in column 8. For taxpayers with incomes up to $50,000, the combined
effect of the income tax change and the corporate tax change is a reduction in
total tax liabilities. But for taxpayers with incomes over $50,000, the
average tax change in each income class is an increase. Column 9 expresses
these changes as a percentage of the old personal tax liability and column 10
as a percentage of the combined personal plus baseline corporate tax
liability.-
—37—
The figures in column 9 imply that the 1986 tax reform actually increased
total tax liabilities of individuals 'in the top income class by 17 percent of
the baseline personal tax liability. For those with incomes between $100,000
and $200,000, the average increase was 13 percent.
A comparison of columns 5 and 9 is perhaps the best indication of the
effect of ignoring the corporate tax changes when evaluating the impact of the
tax reform legislation. The tax reduction in the lowest income class is cut
sharply, from the $70 per return reduction in personal taxes to a combined
reduction equal to only $40 of the initial personal tax liability. Among
those with incomes between $10,000 and $20,000, the tax reduction was cut in
half. In the highest income group, recognizing the change in the corporate
tax implies an additional tax increase equal to 6 percent of the initial
personal tax liability. Among taxpayers with incomes between $100,000 and
$200,000, recognizing the change in the corporate tax implies an additional
tax increase equal to 4 percent of the initial personal tax liability.
Although a comparison of the figures in columns 5 and 9 is the best way
to see the extent to which ignoring the corporate tax increases distorts the
estimated tax change at each income level, the figures in column 9 are
themselves an overstatement of the absolute change in the combined personal
and corporate tax liabilities because the percentage change is based on the
initial personal tax liability alone. Column 10 therefore presents the
combined changes in the personal and corporate tax liabilities as a percentage
of the initial level of the combined personal and corporate tax liabilities.
These percentage changes are absolutely smaller than those of column 9 because












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































comparison, the top two income groups are seen to experience increases of 11
and 13 percent.
The importance of capital income among the lower income tax groups
reflects the importance of older retired or partially retired individuals in
these income classes. It is useful therefore to consider the analysis of the
tax changes separately for older taxpayers and others. Table 5 presents data
for two groups of taxpayers: the first group consists of married taxpayers
filing join returns with neither individual over age 64. The second group
consists of all tax returns with at least one taxpayer age 65 and older.
For joint returns with both taxpayers under age 65 shown in columns 1
through 5 of Table 5, the combined change in personal and corporate income
taxes (column 5) is quite similar to the traditional change in the personal
tax alone (column 3). But for taxpayers over age 65, shown in columns 6
through 10, the two measures of the tax change differ dramatically.
Note first that even the traditional measure of the personal
tax change indicates a tax increase for every income class except the very
lowest one. -This may reflect the absence of an increase in the personal
exemption for those. over age 65 and the greater importance of capital gains in
this age group. Although a more thorough analysis of the effects of the 1986
tax change by age and other demographic characteristics would clearly be
desirable, it lies beyond the scope of this analysis. The emphasis here is on
the contrast between the traditional change in the personal income tax
(columns 7 and 8) and the change in the combined value of the personal and
corporate income taxes (columns 9 and 10).
Column 10 shows that the total tax increase (the combination of the
personal and corporate tax changes) is on average equivalent to a 12 percent-39—
rise in the personal income tax. The combined tax increase ranges from 17
percent in the $10,000 to $20,000 income group to 8 percent for taxpayers in
the highest income group. The net effect of the corporate tax change alone is
equivalent to an increase of about 8 percent of personal income tax
liabilities.
8.Conclusion
This paper has presented a method of imputing to individual tax returns
the net effect of changes in effective corporate tax rates. Particular
attention is given to the difference between nominal and real capital income,
to the problem of corporate pension funds and to the automatic effect of
corporate tax changes on dividends and retained earnings. The analysis is
limited, however, by the static equilibrium assumption, by the lack of a
general portfolio framework of asset demand and by inadequate data on the real
estate assets of individual taxpayers.
Application of this imputation method to the tax changes enacted in 1986
shows that the actual distribution of the total tax change was very different
from the traditional distribution of only the personal income tax change The
net imputed corporate tax increase was equivalent to a rise of 6 percentage
points in the personal income tax among taxpayers with 1988 incomes over
$200,000 and 4 percentage points among taxpayers with incomes between $100,000
and $200,000. The corporate income tax increase also added the equivalent of
an 8 percent rise in the income tax for taxpayers with incomes between $10,000
and $20,000. By contrast, for middle income taxpayers (with incomes between
$30,000 and $75,000) the corporate tax increase was equivalent to an income-40-
tax rise of only 1 or 2 percent. The analysis shows that the highercorporate
tax represents a particularly large increase for taxpayers over theage of 65.
Distributional considerations will continue to play a large role in the
public and Congressional discussions of future tax reforms. The presentstudy
shows that it is very important to include the distributionalconsequences of





9.Unfortunately, no information is available on the individual taxpayers'
implicit net rental income of owner occupied housing.
10. This is clearly true with respect to existing vested benefits. Benefits
that accrue in the future may be modified to reflect the changed return on
pension assets or wages may be adjusted. Eventually the tax on pension assets
will be borne by labor but the transition period may last several decades.
11. Kotlikoff and Smith (1983) indicate that 75 percent of employer plan
pension assets are in defined contribution plans. Total pension assets also
include IRA, Keogh are 401K plans.
12. This excludes the dividends and interest received by state and local
pension plans since taxes borne by those plan assets inure to the detriment of
the state and local governments and their taxpayers rather than to owners of
corporate capital. It is not possible to impute that increase in the tax
burden on state and local governments to individual taxpayers since only 30
percent of the taxpayers itemize tax returns.
13. This includes the interest income and expenses of households and of
pensions and other tax exempt entities.
14. Nontaxable state and local bonds are ignored in the present paper even
though an increase in the tax on capital income would alter the interest rate
on these securities since there is no information about them on individual tax
returns.
15. Note that for the current analysis what matters is the post real
interest rate and not the anticipated ex ante real rate.
16. The interest rates are the Federal Home Loan Bank Board series for new-44-
home mortgage yields.
17. Note that this is not equivalent to the household sector's inflationary
loss on the value of its assets because household debt includes federal
government bonds while corporate sector liabilities are net of assets that
include government securities.
18. The method of estimating the market value of all outstanding corporate
debt is an extension of the method used in Feldstein and Jun (1987) to
estimate the value of the debt of the nonfinancial corporate sector.
19. As explained in Section 3, real net interest income is calculated as the
difference between 43 percent of nominal interest income and 67 percent of
nominal interest expenses.
20. Note that a similar adjustment is not necessary for calculating the
effect of the corporate tax on the personal tax liabilities since the effect
on personal tax liabilities depends only on the amount of interest and
dividends that the individual reports and not on the amount of interest and
dividends that the individual actually receives.
21. The small number of tax returns that have a negative tax liability
because of the rebatable earned income credit are ignored in calculating the
percentage change.
22. Lawrence Lindsey -is currently preparing an analysis of this problem.
23. The contrast between those under 65 and those over 65 also reflects the
greater importance of mortgage debt among those under 65. Since the corporate
taxreducesreal interest rates, it actually benefits those under age 65.—45-
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